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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 USNATO 4154

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM, PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: TEXT OF REVISED SECTION II (ALLIED POSITION)

REF: USNATO 4136

AS A RESULT OF SPC MEETING ON SEPTEMBER 4, IS HAS PREPARED
A REVISED DRAFT OF SECTION II. FULL TEXT BELOW. MISSION
COMMENTS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.

BEGIN TEXT

ALLIANCE APPROACH TO NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR

INTRODUCTION

1. THE PRESENT DOCUMENT CONTAINS FIVE SECTIONS ENTITLED

I. THE GUIDELINES

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

III. NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

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IV. NEGOTIATING PROCEDURES

V. INTRA-ALLIANCE CO-ORDINATION AND SETS OUT EHS UBSTANTIVE
AND PROCEDURAL APPROACH TO MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AS AGREED AMONG
THE ALLIES.

2. THE GUIDELINES PROVIDE THE STANDARD IN TERMS OF WHICH ALLIED GOVERNMENTS WILL DETERMINE ANY NEGOTIATING POSITION; AND AGAINST WHICH ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL MEASURE ANY SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROPOSAL. SECTION II SETS OUT THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION. SECTION III SUGGESTS THE WAYS IN WHICH THE ALLIES MIGHT PRESENT THEIR OWN VIEWS; EXPLORE THE THINKING OF THE OTHER SIDE; AND CONDUCT THE INITIAL STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. SECTION IV SETS OUT THE PROCEDURES FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE ALLIES PREFER. SECTION V DEALS WITH OBJECTIVES AND PROCEDURES OF THE COMPREHENSIVE CONSULTATIVE PROGRAMME AMONG ALLIES IN BRUSSELS AND VIENNA.

I. SECRET GUIDELINES

(FINAL VERSION OF C-M(73)50(3RD REVISE) YET TO BE ESTABLISHED.)

II. THE ALLIED POSITION

INTRODUCTION

3. THE POSITION DESCRIBED IN THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPHS DEFINES THE GOALS THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS HAVE AGREED TO SEEK IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. (IT REPRESENTS NEITHER A RIGID DEFINITION OF THE SO LE ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME NOR A TACTIAL POSITION DESIGNED PRIMARILY FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES.) (1) ADJUSTMENT OF THIS POSITION, FOR INSTANCE IN RESPONSE TO REQUIREMENTS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, WOULD NECESSITATE A COLLECTIVE POLICY DECISION TO BE TAKEN BY THE ALLIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH NATO PROCEDURES AS SET OUT IN SECTION V OF THIS DOCUMENT.

TERMINOLOGY

4. WHEN NECESSARY FOR INTERNAL ALLIANCE PURPOSES OR IN FIRST PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE, FOR INSTANCE,
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DISTINCTIONS AMONG NATO FORCES(2) AND WARSAW PACT FORCES WILL BE MADE IN TERMS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET FORCES ON THE ONE HAND, AND "OTHER NATO FORCES" AND "OTHER WARSAW PACT FORCES" ON THE OTHER HAND, RATHER THAN IN TERMS OF STATIONED AND INDIGENOUS FORCES.

4 BIS. THE TERMS "PHASE", "STAGE" AND "STEP" AS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT DENOTE:

- PHASE: A MAJOR NEGOTIATING PERIOD RESULTING IN AN MBFR AGREEMENT (E.G. THE FIRST PHASE WITH REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET AND US FORCES);

- STAGE: A BLOC OF NEGOTIATING TIME OF UNDETERMINED LENGTH
(E.G. THE INITIAL STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS, LASTING TWO TO FOUR
MONTHS);

- - - - -

(1) THIS BRACKET DOES NOT SIGNIFY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE
STATEMENT ITSELF, BUT ONLY A DOUBT WHETHER IT SHOULD BE
EXPLICITLY WRITTEN INTO THE DOCUMENT.

(2) THE TERM "NATO FORCES" AS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT DOES NOT
INCLUDE FRENCH FORCES.

- - - - -

- STEP: A NEGOTIATING MOVE (E.G. THE PRESENTATION OF
OPENING STATEMENTS IN THE INITIAL STAGE).

(PRINCIPLES

5. AS SET OUT IN THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE, A
BALANCED OUTCOME THAT WILL ENSURE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR
ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE IS A PRINCIPAL ALLIED OBJECTIVE.
THIS OBJECTIVE, WHICH IS BASED ON THE CONCEPT THAT ALLIED
SECURITY IS INDIVISIBLE, SHOULD BE MADE CLEAR TO THE OTHER
SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. MEASURES DESIGNED TO
MAINTAIN UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR NATO FLANK COUNTRIES
SHOULD BE AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES AND NEGOTIATED WITH THE
OTHER SIDE.)(1)

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PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES

6. PRE-REDUCTION STABILISING MEASURES APPLICABLE IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA AIM AT BUILDING CONFIDENCE BY REDUCING THE RISK OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS AND AMBIGUOUS MILITARY ACTIVITY. CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS THE MEANS FOR INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. (CERTAIN MEASURES OF CONSTRAINT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO FORCES RATHER THAN TERRITORIES.)(IT) SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION IN THE ALLIANCE AND TO THE CONSIDERATIONS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH ... OF THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE(2), THE ALLIES

- - - - -
(1) THE BRACKET DOES NOT SIGNIFY DISAGREEMENT WITH THE GENERAL LINE OF THE STATEMENT. MANY DELEGATIONS, HOWEVER, BELIEVE THAT THESE MATTERS WOULD BE MORE APPROPRIATELY DISCUSSED IN THE GUIDELINES SECTION ABOVE. MOST DELEGATIONS AGREE THAT FURTHER ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION OF THE POSSIBLE
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EFFECTS OF REDUCTIONS IN THE CENTRAL REGION ON THE SECURITY OF FLANK COUNTRIES IS REQUIRED, AND THAT RELEVANT ONGOING STUDIES SHOULD BE COMPLETED URGENTLY.

(2) PARAGRAPH 12 OF C-M(73)50(3RD REVISE) REFERS.

- - - - -
WILL SEEK AGREEMENT PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES(1):

(I) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET FORCES INTO THE AREA INCLUDING ROTATIONS;

((II) PRE-ANNOUNCEMENT OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;

(III) LIMITS ON SIZE, LOCATIONS, NUMBER AND DURATION OF MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA;

(IV) EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT MAJOR EXERCISES BY ALL FORCES IN THE AREA.)

REDUCTIONS

7. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA REACHED THROUGH A MAXIMUM 10 PERCENT REDUCTION IN OVERALL NATO GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND WARSAW PACT REDUCTIONS TO THE RESULTING NATO FORCE LEVEL. (THIS FIGURE COULD BE MODIFIED IN THE LIGHT OF STUDIES MADE

BY NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES, AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT POSSIBLE REPERCUSSION ON AGREED NATO STRATEGY: FORWARD DEFENCE, FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.)(BE) (THE COMMON CEILING IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD AS APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF MANPOWER, HEAVY WEAPONRY (TANKS) AND DEPLOYMENT.) (THERE WOULD BE AN INTERNAL ALLIED DECISION TO FIX A FLOOR BELOW WHICH ALLIED REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT GO.)(GE)

- - - - -
(1) (THESE MEASURES COULD ALSO BE ENVISAGED AS POST-REDUCTION SECRET

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MEASURES.)(NE)

8. WITHDRAWAL TO THEIR HOMELANDS OF SOME US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES FROM THE GUIDELINES AREA, AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THE OBJECTIVE DEFINED ABOVE, I.E. TOWARD AN OVERALL NATO/WP GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING ((EXPRESSED FOR CONFIDENTIAL GUIDANCE WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AT THIS STAGE,) AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 MEN ON EACH SIDE).

9. REDUCTIONS OF ALLIED COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE KEPT TO THE MINIMUM POSSIBLE WHILE THE MAXIMUM POSSIBLE REDUCTIONS IN WARSAW PACT COMBAT CAPABILITY SHOULD BE SECURED.

(10. IN THE FIRST PHASE THE SOVIETS SHOULD WITHDRAW A TANK ARMY (5 DIVISIONS AND RELATED ELEMENTS INCLUDING EQUIPMENT) AND THE US WOULD WITHDRAW AN EQUAL PROPORTION OF THE MANPOWER OF ITS STATIONED FORCES IN THE AREA(1). THIS WOULD MEAN REDUCTIONS OF 15 PERCENT ON BOTH SIDES, OR ABOUT 68.000 SOVIET SOLDIERS PLUS 1.700 TANKS AND ABOUT 29.000 US SOLDIERS.)

- - - - -
(1) (THE PRINCIPLE IN PARAGRAPH 9 MEANS THAT US WITHDRAWALS SHOULD BE LIMITED TO A COMBAT CAPABILITY EQUIVALENT OF TWO BRIGADES.)
- - - - -

11. THIS REDUCTION CONCEPT HAS THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL FEATURES:

(I) NATO SHOULD BE PERMITTED FLEXIBILITY IN THE FORM OF WITHDRAWAL/REDUCTION ON GROUNDS OF ASYMMETRY OF CONDITIONS, WHEREAS WITHDRAWAL/REDUCTION OF WARSAW PACT FORCES BY MAJOR UNITS WITH THEIR EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE SOUGHT.

(II) PROVISIONS CONCERNING DISPOSITION OF EQUIPMENT ON BOTH SIDES WILL TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE ASYMMETRIES WHICH PERMIT THE SOVIETS TO REINFORCE MORE RAPIDLY INCSNTRAL EUROPE THAN THE US. DEPENDING ON THE STRUCTURE OF UNITED STATES FORCE

WITHDRAWALS, PROVISIONS SHOULD BE MADE FOR THE STORAGE AND
MAINTENANCE OF US HEAVY EQUIPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE IN ORDER
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TO OFFSET THE FACILITY WITH WHICH THE SOVIET FORCES
WITHDRAWN TO THE WESTERN PARTS OF THE SOVIET UNION COULD RETURN
TO THEIR ORIGINAL POSITIONS.

((III) SOVIET WITHDRAWALS SHOULD INVOLVE DISBANDMENT WITHOUT
REPLACEMENT FROM THE SOVIET STRATEGIC RESERVE.) (UK)

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STABILISING MEASURES, INCLUDING NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS,
TO ACCOMPANY REDUCTIONS

12. SUBJECT TO FURTHER EXAMINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE,
THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON THE FOLLOWING MEASURES
APPLICABLE TO US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN THE NATO
GUIDELINES AREA:

(I) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES INTO THE AREA;

((II) LIMITATIONS ON MOVEMENTS OF FORCES ACROSS NATIONAL
BOUNDARIES WITHIN THE AREA.

(PROPOSALS BY THE EAST FOR APPLICATION OF THESE
CONSTRAINTS TO OTHER NATO FORCES OR FOR FORMULATIONS WHICH

WOULD IMPLY AUTOMATIC APPLICATION OF SUCH CONSTRAINTS IN
SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE REJECTED));

(III) AGREEMENT TO RESPECT THE LEVELS OF US AND SOVIET
GROUND FORCES ESTABLISHED BY A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

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(12 BIS. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK EARLY AGREEMENT ON MEASURES
(INCLUDING, POSSIBLY, CONSTRAINTS) APPLICABLE TO AREAS
OUTSIDE THE GUIDELINES AREA TO ELIMINATE OR MITIGATE ANY
INCREASE OF THE THREAT TO THE FLANKS AS A RESULT OF MBFR
IN THE CENTRAL REGION. EXAMINATION WITHIN THE ALLIANCE
SHOULD BE URGENTLY COMPLETED OR INITIATED ON SUCH MEASURES
AS:

(I) PROVISIONS TO PUT IN RESERVE THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES;

(II) PROVISIONS TO PREVENT THE SOVIET WITHDRAWN FORCES TO BE
DEPLOYED TO THE THREE WESTERN OR THE LENINGRADE AND ODESSA
(OR NORTHERN AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN MILITARY DISTRICTS)).

(12 TER. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK AGREEMENT ON STABILISING
MEASURES IN THE THREE WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICTS OF THE
SOVIET UNION, WITH A PREFERENCE FOR A FORCE LIMITATION
AGREEMENT OR, AT LEAST, OVERT INSPECTION OF MAJOR GROUND
FORCE UNITS, I.E. FORCE LEVELS) (NE)

13. AN IMPORTANT GOAL OF THE ALLIED APPROACH SHOULD
BE TO ENSURE THAT ANY AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED
OR UNDERMINED, FOR EXAMPLE BY MEANS OF AN INCREASE OF THE
SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY (AND IN THE THREE WESTERN MILITARY
DISTRICTS OF THE SOVIET UNION). WHILE ALL POSSIBILITIES
SHOULD BE STUDIED, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY THAT
NON-CIRCUMVENTION WITH RESPECT TO HUNGARY COULD BE ASSURED
THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES SUCH AS
THOSE LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 12 ABOVE, THE BEST TIME TO
DETERMINE WHICH SPECIFIC MEASURES WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE
WILL BE AFTER THE OUTLINE OF A REDUCTION AGREEMENT HAS TAKEN
SHAPE IN NEGOTIATIONS AND ALLIED PROPOSALS REGARDING
HUNGARY CAN BE TAILORED ACCORDINGLY, AND CAN ALSO BE
ADVANCED WITH MINIMUM RISK OF EASTERN COUNTER-PROPOSALS TO
EXPAND THE GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS OF NEGOTIATIONS BEYOND CENTRAL
EUROPE. (CARE MUST, HOWEVER, BE TAKEN TO AVOID A
NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE WHICH COULD BE CONSTRUED TO APPLY
ALSO TO ACE TERRITORIES OUTSIDE OF THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA.)
(GE)

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VERIFICATION

14. THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES.

15.

(A) NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS.

(B) IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES(1) (I.E. TO ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA, SUCH AS:

(I) FEWER RESTRICTIONS ON (NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES AND) MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS;

(II) OBSERVATION OF AGREED WITHDRAWALS BY (NATIONAL MILITARY ATTACHES AND/OR) SPECIAL GROUND OBSERVATION TEAMS CONSTITUTED FOR THIS PURPOSE;

- - - - -

(1) FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS IS REQUIRED

- - - - -

(III) SPECIAL MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN THE POST-MBFR PERIOD;

(IV) LIGHT AIR CAPABILITY (HELICOPTERS) FOR MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS.

(C) THE TERRITORIAL RESTRICTION MADE ABOVE FOR OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES, I.E. THAT THEY ARE APPLICABLE TO THE GUIDELINES AREA, DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF LESS INTRUSIVE VERIFICATION MEASURES DESIGNED TO ACCOMPANY CONSTRAINTS IN AREAS ADJACENT TO THE GUIDELINES AREA. PARTICIPATION OF LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE HOST COUNTRY IN
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ANY INSPECTION TEAM SHOULD BE ASSURED.)

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PROVISIONS FOR THE CONTINUATION OF NEGOTIATIONS IN A SECOND
PHASE

EITHER

(16. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK INCLUSION IN A FIRST PHASE
AGREEMENT OF LANGUAGE PROVIDING FOR A SECOND PHASE OF
(NEGOTIATIONS) (REDUCTIONS). THE FORCES TO BE ADDRESSED
IN THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE THE AGGREGATES OF NATO AND
WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES REMAINING IN THE GUIDELINES AREA
AFTER FIRST-PHASE REDUCTIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK FURTHER
REDUCTIONS OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE SECOND PHASE.)

PLUS

EITHER

(IT WOULD BE UNREALISTIC OR TRY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE TO
DEFINE FURTHER THE CONTENT OF A LATER PHASE BEFORE THE
OUTCOME OF THE FIRST PHASE CAN REALISTICALLY BE PROJECTED
AND THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT ATTEMPT SUCH DEFINITION AT THIS
TIME. SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT BE NEGOTIATED IN
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PARALLEL WITH NEGOTIATION ON THE REDUCTIONS ENVISAGED IN
PARAGRAPHS 7-11 ABOVE. THE ALLIES SHOULD THEREFORE NOT
BECOME INVOLVED IN DISCUSSING THIS TOPIC WITH THE EAST
EARLY IN NEGOTIATIONS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THE SECOND
PHASE WOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF
A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCE
MANPOWER IN THE GUIDELINES AREA.)

OR

(DURING THE SECOND PHASE, WHICH SHOULD BE EXAMINED

AND REFLECTED UPON WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, THE AGGREGATE OF THE NATO FORCES REMAINING IN THE GUIDELINES AREA AFTER THE FIRST PHASE WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE PROPORTION NEEDED TO BRING THE OVERALL REMAINDER - ALLOWING FOR THE REDUCTIONS ALREADY MADE IN US FORCES IN THE FIRST PHASE - TO NO LESS THAN ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THE ORIGINAL LEVEL OF ALL NATO FORCES IN THE MBFR AREA. ON THE OTHER SIDE, ALL REMAINING WARSAW PACT FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED IN THE NECESSARY PROPORTION TO ALLOW THE DESIRED COMMON OVERALL CEILING TO BE ATTAINED. EACH ALLIANCE WOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED. REDUCED FORCES OF COUNTRIES WITHIN THE AREA SHOULD BE INACTIVATED AND PUT IN RESERVE STATUS.) (BE)

OR

(16. THE LINK BETWEEN THE FIRST OR SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS AS WELL AS THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED IN A PRECISE AND COMMITTING MANNER DURING NEGOTIATION OF THE FIRST PHASE. THIS CAN BE DONE IN THE FOLLOWING WAY:

(I) AN INITIAL AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES MUST BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON REDUCTIONS OF NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES IN THE NGA IN ORDER TO COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING AS DEFINED IN PARAGRAPH 7 ABOVE;

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(II) DURING THE FIRST PHASE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE NATO ALLIES WILL NEGOTIATE FOR AGREEMENT TO OUR CONCEPT OF A COMMON CEILING FOR NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE; AND TO THE CONTINUATION OF MBFR IN A SECOND PHASE;

(III) THE DETAILED NEGOTIATION POSITION FOR THE SECOND PHASE, INCLUDING A SPECIFICATION OF THE COMMON CEILING (LEVELS AND COMPOSITION) WILL BE DETERMINED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE. THE ALLIANCE WOULD WISH TO BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTION REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED.) (GE)

OR

(16. AN INITIAL AGREEMENT ON US AND SU FORCES SHOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A SECOND PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS. THIS SECOND PHASE, WHICH IN DUE COURSE SHOULD BE FURTHER EXAMINED AND REFLECTED

UPON WITHIN THE ALLIANCE, WILL FOCUS ON REDUCTIONS OF OTHER NATO AND WP FORCES. MORE PRECISE CONTENTS OF THIS PHASE NEED NOT BE DEFINED AT THIS TIME NOR SHOULD THEY BE ADVANCED TO THE SOVIETS OTHER THAN TO SAY THAT THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD COMPLETE MOVEMENT TO THE OVERALL MBFR GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING ON NATO AND WP GROUND FORCES IN THE GUIDELINES AREA. EACH ALLIANCE WOULD BE FREE TO DECIDE FOR ITSELF HOW THE WEIGHT OF THE REDUCTIONS REQUIRED FOR THE SECOND PHASE SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE NATIONAL FORCES INVOLVED. A LINK BETWEEN A FIRST AND A SECOND PHASE OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE CLEARLY AND FIRMLY ESTABLISHED BY AGREEING DURING THE FIRST PHASE THAT A SECOND PHASE (WITH SOME INDICATION OF ITS CHARACTER) WILL FOLLOW.) (NE)

POST-REDUCTION CEILINGS

(17. SUBSEQUENT TO THE SECOND PHASE THE OVERALL "COMMON CEILINGS" WOULD BE RESPECTED BY EACH SIDE, WITH NO SUB-CEILINGS OTHER THAN THOSE RESPECTIVELY AFFECTING THE US AND SOVIET FORCES WITHIN THE COMMON CEILING.)

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PROVISIONS FOR REVIEW AND AMENDMENT OF, OR WITHDRAWAL FROM, A POSSIBLE PHASE I AGREEMENT

18. (LANGUAGE TO BE PROVIDED LATER.)

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TAGS: PARM, PFOR, NATO
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